Towards a classification of metaphor use
Dominik Lukeš, University of East Anglia
d.lukes@uea.ac.uk, www.bohemica.com/metaphor

Abstract
This paper presents an outline of a classification of metaphor use in text that can aid the interpretation of data obtained from corpora. The classification is exemplified on examples from a developing corpus of both public and academic discourse on educational change. The paper claims that it is necessary to distinguish between metaphor as an organizing principle of the conceptual system and its actual use as one of the mechanisms involved in the cohesion and coherence of a given text.

Introduction
There appears to be a remarkable lack of attempts at classification of metaphor (in contrast to tropes in general and in particular to metonymy). The original classification from Lakoff and Johnson is little used in the field itself and often leads to undue simplifications when employed outside it. Kövecses’ (2002) recent elaboration of it has made a significant step forward but I found it insufficient when seeking to limit the parameters of research into actual uses of metaphor in text. Part of the problem is that both Lakoff and Johnson, and Kövecses are trying to differentiate between metaphors based on their nature while it appears that useful divisions can be found mostly in the context of their use. In fact, there is nothing in the metaphor itself that can help us tell one from another aside from the context of their use. (cf. Ortony, 1993). Lakoff and Johnson themselves concede in the afterword to the second edition of Metaphors We Live By (2003) that in a sense every metaphor is either structural or ontological and a great many are orientational. This is consonant with the approach taken here. In what follows, I have tried to distinguish between metaphors based on the type of uses they might be expected to be put to. This is in no way intended to resemble a definite structured list of naturally occurring categories, it is rather a heuristic device, to help structure the context of inquiry.

I distinguish between three types of uses: cognitive, social and textual, the first two being most relevant to my inquiry. This distinction is remarkably similar to Hallidayan functions of linguistic structures: ideational, interpersonal and textual, underscoring the need for more interaction between the systemic functional and cognitive tradition in discourse analysis. Of direct concern is also the only possible classification of metaphorical expressions that can be made independently of context. It concerns hypostasis, or in other words the salience and recoverability of metaphor, or in Kövecses’ terms conventionality.

Aside from Kövecses, I drew on a classification of metaphor as used by teachers outlined in Cortazzi and Jin (1999), according to whom teachers use metaphor to (among others): Express complex meaning; Construct alternatives; Organize systematic concepts; Invite interaction; Add dramatic effect. Their list conflates social and cognitive uses which I attempt to separate (as a heuristic rather than a descriptive attempt) and ignores the textual aspect of metaphor use altogether.

Of relevance to this inquiry is also Steen (1999a) who makes a distinction between three types of analysis: conceptual, linguistic and communicative which might be seen as parallel to cognitive, textual and interpersonal. However, while my classification is intended as a purely heuristic device to aid in the conceptual analysis of discourse, Steen’s aim is to provide a more fully descriptive framework for the totality of the presence of metaphor in text including their detailed linguistic and propositional structure. As such, it is of direct interest to linguists, particularly those dealing with corpora and seeking to establish a psychological link. A closer examination of the compatibility between his approach and mine will be the subject of further research.

Similarly, Goatly (1997) has proposed a rapprochement between metaphor research and Hallidayan functional linguistics with the corresponding focus on the signalling of metaphor in text and its social context. However, his classification, in my view, failed to substantially address the cognitive nature of metaphor.

Conventionality: salience and recoverability of metaphors
Perhaps the best place to start, if only to preempt some common objections, is conventionality, i.e. a property of metaphorical expressions at least partially independent of use. Conventionality largely pertains to the properties of metaphorical expressions when viewed as lexical items and as such can be viewed from two closely related perspectives: salience and recoverability.

In terms of metaphorical salience, expressions can be placed on a continuum on the one end of which lie entrenched metaphors which are opposed to metaphors that may be called analogical, i.e. metaphors novel to such extent, they have traditionally been called analogies. While the salience of metaphorical expressions is a feature of a given dialect, the degree of recoverability of metaphor is a matter of an idiolect. For instance, a metaphor may be called dead if in a majority of its uses, native speakers of a dialect use it as a lexical item and the original metaphorical projection is not only not active but also not readily available. However, by dint of specialist or random trivial knowledge, a single individual may be able to recover the historical meaning and alter her use of language (a method beloved of latter–day phenomenologists). This is not uncommon in academic discourse. For instance, the author of the following extract talks about one of the meanings in which he uses the word ‘curriculum’ in the sense of a course to be run:
“Essentially, the root, curriculum, is honored: What is/should be the nature of the course or journey on which we take those whom we teach?” (1980, p. xvii)

The recoverability of metaphor is the key issue for conceptual discourse analysis, particularly since unlike salience it is a matter of use rather than the immediately inert lexicon. Any metaphor, no matter how lexicalized or dead, can be recovered given enough effort (this being one of the staple techniques of comedy). It is also important to keep in mind that the conventionality of metaphor can change during discourse or even in the course of a single text.

Cognitive uses
Cognitive uses of metaphor have been at the forefront of attention of conceptual metaphor theory from its very inception to such an extent that one could be forgiven for assuming that that is all there is to metaphor. There are two schools of thought in today's cognitive psychology regarding the cognitive processing of metaphorical expressions. One is represented by Gibbs (e.g. 1994) whose research affirms and extends the proposals of Lakoff and Johnson, and Glucksberg (e.g. 2001) who advocates an alternative view of metaphor processing based on his and his colleagues’ experimental results. Where Gibbs and others assume that metaphors reflect cross-domain mappings as they appear in the conceptual system, Glucksberg advocates the view of metaphorical expressions as basically class-inclusion statements which attributes relevant properties of the vehicle (source domain) to the topic (target domain) attributive statements. I propose that both perspectives are essential for metaphor researchers and should be embraced rather than pitted against one another. Gentner (2001) has taken some steps towards this goal within experimental psychology. My aim is to do the same for discourse analysis.

My solution is to assume a continuum between two types of the cognitive use of metaphor. On one end, are metaphors used constitutively, i.e. one domain is structured in terms of another directly, opposed to metaphors used attributively, i.e. where one domain borrows certain aspects of another (often a socially agreed upon structure) without loosing its own structure. This is not to say, that conceptual structures in line with the core conceptual metaphor theory are not necessary for the cognitive system to function, merely that the metaphorical expressions rely differing degrees of salience of these mappings. Conceptual inferences are inherited in both cases but only for constitutive uses are they actively used in reasoning. The same metaphor may perform both functions and can change in the same text. Another thing that should be borne in mind is that this continuum is distinct from but related to that of conventionality and recoverability.

One example may be the phrase ‘The Fourth R’, which was first used as the title for the 1970 Durham report on religious education. This attempts to position religious education into a group of subjects concentrating on essential basic skills that should be transmitted by education. In its text, however, the report explicitly states, that religious education should not be treated like other subjects. The same title was adopted by a magazine which makes this point explicitly: “reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic" religion is the fourth ‘R’ of basic literacy."1 However, the same metaphor has been used for computer literacy (http://www.fourthr.com) and human rights: “the teaching of human rights is as basic as teaching the traditional three Rs.”2 A search on Google reveals a whole host of uses to which this simple attribution is being put in a various state of elaboration.

This distinction also blurs the contentious line between metaphor and metonymy, which I consider one of its fringe benefits, although I acknowledge that the two tropes have been held not only to be separate but in their distinctness representative of different kinds of reasoning. I believe that a more complex engagement with research into conceptualization will indicate that establishing (blended) connections is central to the workings of conceptual structures. Researchers and should be embraced rather than pitted against one another. Gentner (2001) has taken some steps towards this goal within experimental psychology. My aim is to do the same for discourse analysis.

Let us briefly examine some crucial distinctions that pertain mostly to metaphors closer to the constitutive pole of the cognitive use continuum. I divide them between explanatory and generative. Explanatively used metaphors are usually low on salience and of medium recoverability. Even though, they are used unconsciously without explicit purpose, they enable us to make sense of complex concepts or entire stretches of discourse. They facilitate the acquisition of lexemes and idioms, as well as the building of mental spaces, i.e. online mental structures (cf. Lakoff, 1987).

The explanatory use of metaphor can then be further divided into structural, ontological or orientational which describe the degree of elaboration in the metaphoric projection, i.e. the extent to which the target domain is structured by the source domain (see Kövecses, 2002).

On the opposite pole lie metaphors which may be termed generative. The idea of a generative metaphor harks back to Schönh (1983) who saw it as a useful heuristic device for generating new solutions to problems through reconceptualizing them, when the old conceptualization ceases to yield results. Generative metaphors are often employed in organizational management (see Morgan, 1986). They have much in common with analogies as described by Gentner (e.g. 2001). As we will see below, generative metaphors are often associated with specific interpersonal uses of metaphor, and as such are extremely common in educational discourse (and academic discourse in general).

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1 http://www.westar institute.org/Periodicals/periodicals.html
2 http://www.amnestyusa.org/education/4thr.html
Generative metaphors are by definition high on salience and easily recoverable. They are conscious and purposeful, and their full processing often requires considerable imaginative effort. Schön’s example of experts deciding to view paint brushes as pumps in order to improve manufacturing standards is a classic.

Education is a particularly fertile ground for generative metaphors, as will be shown below. One example is the proposal of a ‘pedocratic oath’ defined as:

“parallel to the Hippocratic Oath in medicine. This would contain aspects of what is logically involved in teaching, including the ethical seriousness of the enterprise; it would set out a form of contract with the consumer, be it parent or student. In the university context for example, we ought to be able to devise some more precise contractual guidelines which demarcate our responsibilities as teachers, tutors and supervisors, and our compatible expectations of students.” (Whitfield, 1976, p. 22)

A particularly illuminating, if rather lengthy, example comes from Bobbitt’s (1971 [1918]) book on the curriculum. The section highlighted in bold is an explanatively constitutive statement which is then expanded into a lengthy generative elaboration highlighted in grey:

the mother-tongue is a man’s primary instrument of social intercourse and intercommunication. ... so it might be suggested that it's ok, if he knows it “just enough” ... It would appear, however, that an instrument which is used almost continuously throughout one's waking hours for thought and communication, and throughout one's entire lifetime, should be a good instrument for the purpose, not a crude cheap one; and that it should be well understood and appreciated in order that it be carefully and intelligently used. The motor-car one uses for recreation one prefers to be of good design, clean, properly finished, quiet, smooth-running. One is not satisfied with just anything that will run. One's clothing we feel should be of good design and color, clean and not displeasing to others; not just anything, regardless of others, that will keep one warm. In the same way, one's language which is more intimately related to one's life than either of these things and which is a permanent possession, not one that is changed frequently, should also be of good design, correct, polished, accurate and socially pleasing; not just anything that will crudely express a crude thought. (p. 247)

The segments in italics illustrate another important feature of metaphor which is its constant interaction with seemingly literal language. Detailed analysis would require tools from the conceptual blending theory which is well outside the scope of this paper.

Social (interpersonal) uses
The social dimension of metaphor use is much less investigated than its cognitive counterpart. Cortazzi and Jin (1999) make an attempt at it in their account of how teachers use metaphors but do not distinguish between their cognitive, textual and interpersonal uses. While, these uses can of course never occur separately, I believe that it is beneficial to keep them apart for the purposes of this provisional classification.

While the interpersonal functions of metaphor are probably much more extensive, I will content myself with about 6 categories.3 (The hedge is deliberate since some of these categories may in fact be identical except for the analyst’s perspective.) It will also become clear that there is much overlap between these categories when encountered in a text. They are:

- Conceptual/Declarative
- Figurative
- Innovative
- Exegetic
- Prevaricative
- Performative

The majority of interpersonal uses of metaphor are conceptually declarative, i.e. the primary purpose of the speaker is to share information with the recipient through establishing a mutually compatible conceptual background (i.e. mental space). In fact, this might be considered the default state (simply assumed by most metaphor theorists in a Gricean fashion) which is to a lesser or greater degree superseded by one of the other uses. When, the purpose of the speaker is simply to make her discourse more appealing, whether to avoid repetition of for another reason, a metaphor can be used purely figuratively. This mode is particularly common in fiction and poetry but is increasingly popular in non-fiction (going back to Darwin and further) and even in general academic discourse.

When the salience of metaphor increases to the extent that it is used deliberately or even generatively, its interpersonal function takes one of the remaining guises.

Generative metaphors, in particular, are used either innovatively or exegetically. Innovatively used metaphors seek to shed new light on a specific problem, and it has been often assumed that, such use of metaphor is where the benefits of metaphor lie.

Academic and general discourse, however, often puts metaphor to a related but quite distinct use, namely that of exegesis, or a new reading of somebody else’s position of views. For instance, Petrie (1979) summarized

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3 A much more detailed account of the social/interpersonal dimension taking into account Halliday’s functionalism and Relevance Theory was suggested by Goatly (1997).
R. M. Miller’s (1976) position on the utility of metaphor as an instrument of instruction as “metaphors have all the advantage over explicit language as does theft over honest toil” although that is only a very loose interpretation of Miller’s position. Both the innovative and exegetic functions of metaphor are amply attested in educational discourse. For instance, the following example consisting of a quotation and a comment contains both:

Quotation: “Basically, the Conservative Government retained a very élitist notion of education, subscribing to the concept of an educational ladder as opposed to the ‘broad highway’ of the Labour Party.” Comment: “In some ways it is easier to grasp the notion of the ladder than the ‘broad highway’ – the nature of the highway and even its general direction lack clarity, and has only been examined in terms of curriculum content during the last years.” (Lawton, 1975, p. 5)

Another common feature attributed to metaphors by critics is their use to mislead or directly deceive one’s discourse partner. I call this function prevaricative, although it is difficult to see how it is different from the other social uses, particularly since the intention of the speaker is often imputed by the analyst’s own interest. Many have been only too eager to talk of the prevaricative nature of other people’s metaphor and consequently I will have little to say about this feature from now on.

The performative function of metaphor, on the other hand, is central to any analysis of policy discourse. It is the type of conceptual and expressive practice alluded to by Paquette when discussing the conceptualization of schooling:

“… the vision of schools shared by many, if not most, stakeholders in education is strikingly reminiscent of the view Catholics and orthodox Christians have long had of their sacraments, that is, things which bring about what they symbolize.” (Paquette, 1991, p. 1)

First of all, that statement is itself of a metaphorical nature cognitively generative and interpersonally exegetic. However, the social purpose of the speech acts, it refers to constitutes a separate interpersonal function. It is certainly true that many of the attributive and some non-generative constitutive metaphors are used performatively in public discourse. For instance, the metaphor of the marketplace in education may be often encountered in this guise:

“We must give consumers of education a central part in decision-making. That means freeing schools and colleges to deliver the standards that parents and employers want. It means encouraging the consumer to expect and demand that all educational bodies do the best job possible. In a word, it means choice.” (Kenneth Baker, introducing a new Education Bill in 1987)

The performative nature of the metaphor is underscored by the fact that many of the addressees of the speech were educators who did not share Baker’s vision of education as a marketable service and were in effect being forced into a conceptualization where standards of education are measured by the choices made by consumers.

Textual uses

While the parallelism between this three-fold classification of metaphor use and Halliday’s linguistic functions is more or less coincidental, the division of the textual uses owes a direct debt to the Hallidayan tradition of text analysis, starting with Halliday’s and Hasan’s ground-breaking work and drawing heavily on Hoey’s contribution to the study of cohesive chains (Hoey, 1991) and Sinclair et al.’s work on local grammars (e.g. Hunston and Sinclair, 2000).

Following these, I see metaphor as contributing both to the coherence and cohesion of any given text. Although, like most of the categories in this classification, cohesion and coherence are really two sides of the same coins, it might be beneficial, at least for the moment to distinguish between them. They both contribute to “texture”, i.e. the sum total of internal ties holding a text together, but while cohesion can be observed on the surface of discourse, coherence is a matter of signalled conceptual ties. It is one of the challenges of text linguistics today, to show exactly how these two aspects of texture interact but a subject quite outside the scope of my interest here.

I see the cohesive functions of metaphor as having to do with the direction of its ‘binding power’. Therefore, this type of use could also be called phoric. Most common of these links in text is the anaphoric one, i.e. referring back to previous items in text. This might be expected particularly with instances of cognitively generative and interpersonally innovative or exegetic metaphors, set up at the start of a text and being referred to implicitly with a keyword. The opposite of this, is the cataphoric use, i.e. opening the mental space to possible backward reference. Unlike pronouns, where cataphora is possible only over very short, stretches of text (up to one sentence ahead), cataphorically used metaphors set up a mental space that can theoretically last over a whole book or even an oeuvre. In this way, metaphors function as text world builders in the sense of Werth (1999). The cognitive status of cataphorically used metaphors is most likely to be constitutive while in the anaphoric context

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4 Peter McLaren (1993) seems to make a similar point in his Schooling as a Ritual Performance where he argues “for the primacy of understanding schooling from the perspectives of culture and performance.” (p. 1)

5 Otherwise, most of the metaphorical cohesion can be classed as lexical in Hallidayan terms.
they might be cognitively closer to the attributive pole with decreased salience. Indeed, it might be hypothesized that the more prominent the textual function, the less salient and cognitively constitutive will be the metaphor.

The exophoric use of metaphor is close to what has been, with as much hype as substance, called intertextuality. In this case, predominantly attributive metaphors, bind the current text into the surface context of the surrounding discourse, borrowing not only the conceptual structure but mostly (sometimes exclusively) its attendant affective connotations.

Distinguishing these intra and intertextual functions of metaphor brings into question the status and equivalence of so called metaphoric keywords used for instance by Charteris-Black (2004) who claims to have identified a constitutive (in my terminology) metaphor POLITICS IS RELIGION based on the presence of keywords such as vision or faith in the language of party manifestos. However, on this account, this is a prime example of a heavily attributive metaphor with an exophoric textual function. No conceptual structure such as LAWS ARE RELIGIOUS LAWS or POLITICIANS ARE PRIESTS is inherited. Even the common ontological mapping, POLITICIANS ARE PREACHERS is not present in that particular text, despite the fact, that it is probably the attributive exphoric use of religious metaphors that stands at the root of this particular conceptualization.

The contribution of metaphor to the coherence of a text is straightforwardly obvious and inseparable from its phoric function. What can and perhaps should be singled out, it its ‘semantic scope’. Metaphors in text are implicitly assumed to be unproblematically uniform in their scope. On closer inspection, nothing could be further from the truth and I believe it to be profitable to distinguish local coherence from global. Locally coherent metaphors only influence a particular portion of a text, often repeated throughout a given discourse, but have little relevance outside this immediate scope. Global metaphors, on the other hand, may have a limited textual presence, but they may be crucial not just for the generation of subsequent metaphoric references but also for the interpretation of what appear to be purely literal statements. I will exemplify this distinction in more detail below and in Case Study 3.

The differentiation of global and local coherence is reminiscent of Ortony’s (1993) distinction between ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ metaphors. Alluding to the status of ‘macroscopic’ metaphors, Blenkin et al. (1992, p. 143) go on to say: “they go beyond the merely illustrative or amplificatory use of metaphor and accept the metaphor as a basis for developing an argument. It is when this happens that the metaphor has become a dangerous rhetorical device.”

On the other hand, local metaphors are often neglected, as pointed out by Steen (1999b, p. 60) who refers to them as one-shot metaphors (in opposition to systematic metaphors). Awareness of local metaphors is particularly important in the analysis of policy discourse where a local metaphor might be interpreted globally. To illustrate, let us compare two segments of two different texts:

A: “[it was] six years into my teaching career -- that my allegiance to behavioral objectives began crumbling.”
(Trumbull, 1990, p. 171)

B: “They want to migrate a small number of schools each year to the new system of higher standards and accountability. While doing so, they are bringing in sort of educational swat teams to advise the newly recruited schools in all the systems. I am with a team of ten American women educators who are working in three girls’ schools to facilitate the reform.” (personal email from a colleague on a project)

Text A contains two constitutive metaphors ‘allegiance to behavioral objectives’ and ‘crumbling allegiance’. Both are cases of a cognitively constitutive and interpersonally declarative metaphor of medium to low recoverability that play no role in the text other than to express an abstract context. From the perspective of a conceptual analysis of the text, they are of little interest. The metaphor highlighted in B, on the other hand, is interpersonally innovative and cognitively attributive. Its innovative nature, however, would make it possible to attribute a significance to it, which it clearly does not have and thus misinterpret it as a global metaphor.6

**Classification in practice**

To conclude, let us illustrate the importance of the classification on two examples of extended text. The first was analyzed in a recent paper by Koller (2005) who maintains that her analysis demonstrates the presence of three sub-metaphors of the metaphor of evolutionary struggle in the text on corporate mergers: FIGHTING, FEEDING and MATING. While this appears broadly right, an analysis *sub specie* the classification of metaphor use not only identifies further metaphorical expressions but also brings into question the cognitive status of the metaphors identified by Koller. Furthermore, the interaction between metaphorical and literal language, completely ignored by Koller, is of importance if we are interested in the conceptual foundations of a specific discourse as a whole rather than merely the presence of certain elements reflecting the presence of metaphors in the conceptual inventory of discourse participants.

1 How mergers go wrong  
2 It is important to learn the lessons from the failures and successes of past mergers  
4 They are, like second marriages, a triumph of hope over experience. A stream of studies has shown that corporate mergers have even higher failure rates than the liaisons of Hollywood stars. One report by KPMG, a consultancy, concluded that

6 Issues to do with style and register are also relevant here but outside of the scope of my interest.
over half of them had destroyed shareholder value, and a further third had made no difference. Yet over the past two years, companies around the globe have jumped into bed with each other on an unprecedented scale.

Most of the mergers we have looked at were defensive, meaning that they were initiated in part because the companies involved were under threat. Sometimes, the threat was a change in the size or nature of a particular market: McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing, for example, because its biggest customer, the Pentagon, was cutting spending by half. Occasionally the threat lay in that buzzword of today, globalisation, and its concomitant demand for greater scale: Chrysler merged with Daimler-Benz because, even as number three in the world’s largest car market, it was too small to prosper alone. Or the threat may have come from another predator: Bayerische Vereinsbank sought a merger with a Bavarian rival, Hypobank, because its management was scared of being gobbled up by Deutsche Bank.

When a company merges to escape a threat, it often imports its problems into the marriage. Its new mate, in the starry moments of courtship, may find it easier to see the opportunities than the challenges. Hypobank is an egregious example: it took more than two years for Vereinsbank to discover the full horror of its partner’s balance sheet.

It seems that the different metaphors identified by Koller have quite different status cognitively and are put to slightly different uses interpersonally and textually. In as much as is possible to ascertain from a fragment, it appear that the MATING metaphor is the only one to have a global reach, whereas the FEEDING metaphor is used mostly locally. Cognitively, the FEEDING and FIGHTING metaphors are used constitutively, while the marriage metaphor is in many respects closer to the attributive end of the continuum. For instance, in the sentence “it took more than two years for Vereinsbank to discover the full horror of its partner’s balance sheet,” the word “partner” can be interpreted both metaphorically and literally, but no conceptual structure such as BALANCE SHEET IS DOWRY is evoked. Rather, the associated affective attribute of marriage as a “horror” is alluded to but not fully explicated. The dual literal/figurative reading of this sentence suggests the limited conceptual constitutive role of the MATING metaphor. This is further underscored by the subsequent mention of “personal chemistry” which is elaborated rather incoherently as “no company can have two bosses for long”, this statement serving as a segue into the FIGHTING metaphor which seems to be more cognitively constitutive oscillating between explanatory and generative uses. For instance, the reason for mergers is given to be “defensive” (line 10) in response to a threat (lines 11 and 21) and the behavior of employees of the company that is taken over is characterized generatively as “guerrilla warfare” (line 30).

Interpersonally, it seems that most of the uses of the MATING metaphor are figurative, while textually, they are exophoric. This might explain their high frequency, despite their limited conceptual foundation.

From the perspective of metaphor classification, it appears that the assumption that all the metaphors in the text have a similar (if not identical status) led Koller not only to assign them weight based on their frequency and distribution, but also to inexplicably avoid some expressions which clearly contribute to the conceptual make up of the text.

Let us illustrate this further on an example from education, which comes from the introduction to the Tomlinson report on 14-19 education (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/14-19):

It is our view that the status quo is not an option. Nor do we believe further piecemeal changes are desirable. Too many young people leave education lacking basic and personal skills; our vocational provision is too fragmented; the burden of external assessment on learners, teachers and lecturers is too great; and our system is not providing the stretch and challenge needed, particularly for high attainers. The results are a low staying-on rate post-16; employers having to spend large sums of money to teach the ‘basics’; HE struggling to differentiate between top performers; and young people’s motivation and engagement with education reducing as they move through the system.

Our report sets out a clear vision for a unified framework of 14-19 curriculum and qualifications. We want scholarship in subjects to be given room to flourish and we want high quality vocational provision to be available from age 14. These are different, but both, in their own terms, are vital to the future wellbeing of young people and hence our country. We want to bring back a passion for learning, and enable all learners to achieve as highly as possible and for their achievements to be recognised. We must ensure rigour and that all young people are equipped with the knowledge, skills and attributes needed for HE, employment and adult life. Despite its weaknesses, the current system has its strengths. Many elements of the reforms we propose can already be found in schools and colleges around the country and we want to build on their good practice. We also wish to retain the best features of existing qualifications and particularly the well-established GCSE and A level route.
While they would not be available as separate qualifications, GCSEs and A levels and good vocational qualifications would become ‘components’, which form the building blocks of the new system.

Change should be a managed EVOLUTION AND NOT A REVOLUTION. It is VITAL that all stakeholders are involved in the detailed work necessary and that all decisions are informed by sound evidence borne out of careful piloting and modelling. Teachers, lecturers and trainers will need support throughout and their experience drawn upon. Parents, governors and young people should be kept fully informed and the CREDIBILITY OF THE CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS PROTECTED through the period of change.

The metaphors in this text belong to roughly four models: 1. the market model, 2. physical structure model, 3. citizenship model, 4. morality and growth model. The details of their distribution can be seen in the table below. It is interesting that despite its most prominent presence, the physical structure model, which enables us to see education as a structure with boundaries and containing objects has a very low salience and is used purely conceptually in its interpersonal function. It serves to enable the market model relying on concepts such as provision, which are however used mostly attributively.

The other two models could be considered constitutive but this is moderated by their intertextual prominence. Their interpersonal function is largely performative in that it signals to the audience the speaker’s commitment to a certain action rather than attempting to convey new meaning.

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<td>‘components’, which form the building blocks of the new system</td>
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It seems appropriate that the most common textual metaphors in this introduction are cognitively attributive and socially performative. Textually, the majority of these metaphors are exophoric and local. This is given by their essential performative interpersonal nature. The author is performing the action through utterance (very much like saying “I pronounce this report presented.”) What is remarkable about this introduction (and about the report as a whole) is its lack of genuinely generative metaphor with socially innovative uses. This might seem paradoxical at first given the report’s focus on reform. However, on closer examination of the political context of conservative and market-oriented tendencies in education, we see that the choice to use metaphors performatively and exophorically is not only understandable but echoes the author’s need for establishing common ground.

As a preliminary conclusion based on a very small sample, it appears, that to do justice to the conceptual analysis of discourse, it is important to first distinguish between constitutive and attributive uses of metaphors in text and to pay attention to their interpersonal and textual uses, to truly assess their conceptual import. In all this, it is important to distinguish between attempts to arrive at an analysis of the conceptual inventory of a particular discourse community and an actual understanding of the conceptual structure of any one particular text generated within that community.
References